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OVERVIEW — This paper examines the existing public health infrastructure
with an emphasis on the resources and activities necessary for public health
emergency preparedness and response. It provides a brief historical overview
of the evolution of public health and contrasts public health interventions with
medicine and health care services. The paper summarizes the broad range of
activities that constitute public health practice today and provides a more de-
tailed review of functions and services that are critical to emergency response
capabilities. It explores the legal foundation for public health authorities, dis-
cussing constitutional, federal, and state public health law. The paper also
summarizes how public health is organized and structured at all levels of gov-
ernment and discusses the roles and responsibilities of the multiple organiza-
tions responsible for responding to a public health emergency.
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The threat of bioterrorism appears much more real to the average citizen
today than it did a year or even a few months ago. With this newly ac-
knowledged threat has come the realization that the nation’s public health
infrastructure is not adequately prepared to respond to a broad-scale
bioterrorism attack. After decades of complacency regarding the dangers
posed by infectious diseases, Americans are recognizing the need to make
significant investments in public health, and Congress has taken actions to
expedite these investments. Unprecedented levels of federal funding have
been appropriated to strengthen the capacity and capabilities of the public
health system. Bioterrorism bills that create new mechanisms for federal
support for public health preparedness and confer new authorities on pub-
lic health agencies have passed both the Senate and the House and are
awaiting the action of a conference committee.
As the initial legislative responses to the terrorist events of the fall of 2001
are being implemented, fundamental questions have been raised regard-
ing our nation’s public health system: Who should be responsible for pro-
viding a public health response in the event of an emergency? What re-
sources are needed to be prepared? How can the nation ensure an ad-
equate return on its investments in public health? The answers to these
questions hinge, in part, on the nature and structure of the existing public
health system. The public health system is complex and fragmented and
can be difficult to understand. This background paper is intended to pro-
vide policymakers with a comprehensive overview of how public health
is currently structured and organized. It provides a summary of the ser-
vices and activities that make up public health practice, describes the le-
gal foundation for public health interventions, and discusses the roles
and responsibilities of the multiple organizations responsible for respond-
ing to a public health emergency.
WHAT IS PUBLIC HEALTH?
The mission of public health is to promote physical and mental health,
prevent disease, injury, and disability, and protect the public from envi-
ronmental hazards.1 It is distinct from health care in that public health
focuses on the prevention of disease within populations, while health care
focuses on the treatment of disease in individuals. Public health and health
care are clearly interrelated and interdependent, so much so that there is
no consensus on the precise boundaries between the two disciplines. Public
health and health care share the common vision of ensuring good health
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and often pursue overlapping strategies to achieve this vision. Just as
public health may deliver services to individuals (for example, immuni-
zations) to ensure the health of the broader population, medical practi-
tioners may draw from population-based studies of health determinants
to guide preventive care for their patients (for example, nutritional coun-
seling and smoking cessation). Despite their close relationship, medicine
and public health represent distinct fields with separate infrastructures
and financing mechanisms, unique perspectives, and a divergent, some-
times, tumultuous history. A brief examination of this history provides a
deeper understanding of the services and systems that are typically re-
ferred to as “public health” today.
A Historical Perspective
Prior to the early 20th century, when the scientific basis of disease was poorly
understood, public health and medicine worked together collaboratively.
What are now known to be infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis, influ-
enza, pneumonia, and streptococcal infections, were the major causes of death
and disability.2  Prevailing medical treatments, such as purging and bleed-
ing, were largely ineffective, and public health measures, such as sanitation
and quarantine, were relied on to control disease. Although the etiologic
nature of disease was not known, early efforts to systematically track dis-
eases had established associations between illnesses and sources of expo-
sure (for example, contaminated food and water). Public health measures
that sought to limit these exposures were societies’ most successful tools for
staying healthy. Physicians who treated individual patients who had already
succumbed to disease were often in the best position to notice similarities in
the locations and practices of those infected and, thus, were instrumental in
targeting public health interventions.3
After the advent of bacteriology in the late 19th century, which established
bacteria as the causative agent in many infectious diseases, the medical
diagnosis and treatment of these diseases became dramatically more effec-
tive.4  Therapies such as antitoxins, vaccinations, and, later, antibiotics pro-
vided physicians with powerful tools for preventing and curing disease in
individual patients. As these medical practices became more advanced and
sophisticated and scientific knowledge expanded dramatically post–World
War II, the biomedical paradigm for responding to infectious disease be-
gan to eclipse the public health approach. Traditional public health mea-
sures continued and in fact were strengthened by the improving science
base of microbiology. However, the public began to take these practices for
granted and came to expect clean water and safe food, with little aware-
ness of the systems and services required to ensure these conditions. Public
expectations focused increasingly on the promises of the next “medical
miracle” that would enhance longevity.5
As the combined efforts of medicine and public health drastically reduced
the threat and changed the management of infectious diseases, public
Leading Causes of Death
in the United States,
1900 and 2000
1900
■ Pneumonia and influenza
■ Tuberculosis
■ Diarrhea, enteritis, and
ulceration of intestines
■ Diseases of the heart
■ Intracranial lesions of vascu-
lar origin
■ Nephritis
■ All accidents
■ Cancer and other malignant
tumors
■ Senility
■ Diphtheria
Source: National Office of Vital
Statistics, December 1947.
2000
■ Diseases of the heart
■ Malignant neoplasms
■ Cerebrovascular disease
■ Chronic lower respiratory
diseases
■ Accidents
■ Diabetes mellitus
■ Influenza and pneumonia
■ Alzheimer’s disease
■ Nephritis, nephrotic syn-
drome, and nephrosis
■ Septicemia
Source: National Vital Statistics Re-
port, 49, no.12 (October 9, 2001).
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health’s mission began to evolve. In part, this evolution entailed an in-
creasing emphasis on interventions targeted at individuals as a means of
preventing the spread of disease through communities.6 Public health
became, and in some areas of the country remains, an important provider
of health care services—for example, immunizations and treatment for
tuberculosis (TB) and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs)—particularly
for low-income persons or rural citizens who lack access to private health
care providers. Seeing the broad needs of these patients, some public health
organizations also expanded their service offerings beyond those related
exclusively to infectious disease and began to provide more comprehen-
sive primary care services, such as prenatal care, well child clinics, and
disease screenings. Public health agencies generally view themselves as
the health care provider of last resort and tend not to offer these services
if they are otherwise available within the community. Despite this limita-
tion, these activities began to consume such a large proportion of public
health resources that, to some, public health became synonymous with
publicly financed medical care.
At the same time, chronic diseases, such as cardiovascular disease, can-
cer, and diabetes, replaced infectious diseases as the nation’s major health
threat, and public health also began to direct its prevention efforts to-
ward the lifestyle-related risk factors associated with these diseases. Pub-
lic health efforts aimed at developing and sponsoring programming to
promote healthy behaviors (for example, good nutrition, physical activ-
ity, tobacco cessation, and responsible sexual behavior) became increas-
ingly prominent.7  This expansion into behavioral interventions brought
new political challenges as many began to question government’s role in
the value-laden, personal life-style choices of its citizens.
Current Scope of Public Health Practice
Today, public health retains its responsibilities for preventing and con-
trolling infectious diseases but has also embraced a much wider set of
obligations. Public health prevents epidemics and the spread of disease,
protects against environmental hazards, prevents injury, promotes and
encourages healthy behaviors, responds to disasters and assists commu-
nities in recovery, and assures the quality and accessibility of health ser-
vices. Public health practices to accomplish these objectives are summa-
rized conceptually by the ten “essential services of public health” laid
out by the Public Health Services Steering Committee of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS).”8
The activities that can be undertaken to discharge these services are in-
credibly diverse. Determining which activities and practices to pursue is
a decision that is made at state and local levels. As the landmark 1988
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report The Future of Public Health observed,
“Different communities have different health problems and they have
appreciably different political and social organizations and values. So
Ten Essential Services
of Public Health
■ Monitor health status to
identify community health
problems.
■ Diagnose and investigate
health problems and health
hazards in the community.
■ Inform, educate, and empower
people about health needs.
■ Mobilize community partner-
ships to identify and solve health
problems.
■ Develop policies and plans that
support individual and commu-
nity health efforts.
■ Enforce laws and regulations
that protect health and ensure
safety.
■ Link people to needed personal
health services and assure the
provision of health care when
otherwise unavailable.
■ Assure competent public health
and personal health care
workforce.
■ Evaluate effectiveness, accessi-
bility, and quality of personal and
population-based services.
■ Conduct research for new
insights and innovative solutions
to health problems.
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public health systems in these communities vary widely and offer widely
differing public health services.9 ”
While it is difficult to make sweeping generalizations about the nature of
public health services throughout the nation, local public health capacity
typically includes capabilities in each of the three “core functions” identi-
fied in the 1988 IOM report: (a) assessment, (b) policy development, and
(c) assurance.
Assessment — Assessment activities are focused on determining the na-
ture, extent, and characteristics of diseases and injuries within popula-
tions and evaluating health conditions and resources within communi-
ties. These activities are grounded in the scientific base of disease surveil-
lance and epidemiology. Disease surveillance is “the on-going, systematic
collection, analysis, and interpretation of outcome-specific data for use in
planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice.”10
Epidemiology is the study of the prevalence and spread of disease within
a community. Although epidemiology is often based on surveillance data,
epidemiology is an independent public health practice that can proceed
in the absence of an established database. Epidemiological investigations
are undertaken to establish the cause, modes of transmission, distribu-
tion, and environmental and other factors contributing to the disease.
Assessment activities include the following:
■ Collecting data (for example, vital statistics, health facilities, health
manpower, health interviews and assessments, and behavioral risk
factor surveys).
■ Establishing health objectives.
■ Monitoring and analyzing communicable disease reports.
■ Performing epidemiological case investigations.
■ Tracing contacts of persons known to be exposed to communicable
disease agents.
■ Performing disease screening (for example, specimen collection,
cancer screening, and TB screening).
■ Conducting laboratory analyses (for example, toxicology screens, and
DNA fingerprinting).
■ Conducting epidemiological research.
■ Assessing community quality of life.
■ Monitoring progress in attaining community health goals.
■ Establishing links with private-sector organizations to develop
comprehensive information on health indicators.
■ Establishing and promoting standards for data collection and dis-
semination.11,12
Policy Development — Policy development activities represent the laws,
regulations, ordinances, standards, plans, budgets, and guidance that
public health officials establish to guide the actions of public and private
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organizations. These policies include rules for food safety, occupational
health, health care delivery system operations, environmental standards,
emergency preparedness plans, and public health authorities for emer-
gency action. Policy development represents a process that involves
elected officials, appointed decision makers, advocacy groups, the com-
munity at large, and those affected by the policy decisions. It is through
this process that community needs and priorities are framed, debated,
and addressed.
Assurance — Assurance activities represent actions to intervene in dis-
ease or care processes to prevent the spread of disease through popula-
tions, promote healthy conditions, and ensure the quality of medical care
available to treat disease in individuals. Assurance activities include the
following:
■ Licensing, inspecting, and regulating food service, recreation, day
care, housing, and health care facilities to ensure compliance with
standards.
■ Providing education and training to make people aware of health
risks and to communicate strategies to avoid these risks.
■ Monitoring and managing environmental conditions (for example, air
quality, occupational safety, radiation control, solid waste management,
hazardous waste management, water safety, and sewage disposal).
■ Controlling disease vectors (for example, mosquito spraying) and
animal reservoirs (for example, rodent control).
■ Providing personal health care services (for example, immunizations,
TB/STD clinics, maternal and child health clinics, home health, mental
health, dental care, and substance abuse treatment).
■ Facilitating enrollment in public insurance programs.
■ Instituting isolation and quarantine protocols, when necessary.
■ Advocating for additional resources.
■ Providing technical assistance to health care providers and busi-
nesses (for example, providing guidance to pharmacies on appropriate
inventories of antibiotics).
■ Mobilizing community partnerships to improve capacities and
encourage coordination.13
While public health activities are carried out by both the public and the
private sectors, government (federal, state, and local) plays a central role in
protecting the health of the public. The IOM committee that produced The
Future of Public Health found “that federal, state, and local public health agen-
cies have an obligation to assume certain vital [public health] functions
directly....these responsibilities cannot properly be delegated to the private
sector.”14  The specific activities that make up these vital functions are not
clearly defined and, in fact, have been interpreted differently over time and
across political jurisdictions. However, historically government has assumed
primary responsibility for responding to those health threats that most
“Federal, state, and lo-
cal public health agen-
cies have an obligation
to assume certain vital
[public health] func-
tions directly.”
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directly influence the collective health of the population, including infec-
tious disease control, environmental safety, and disaster response. Other
public health objectives, such as preventing injury, promoting healthy
behaviors, and assuring the quality and accessibility of health services
rely more heavily on public-private partnerships.
Public Health Emergencies: Preparedness and Response
In the event of a public health emergency, such as a bioterrorism attack;
a naturally occurring infectious disease epidemic; an earthquake, flood,
hurricane or other natural disaster; or any event that has the potential
for significant health impacts, Americans expect governmental public
health agencies to take action to limit the extent of death and disability
within the population. The responsibilities that governmental public
health agencies must be positioned to discharge in the event of a public
health emergency represent a special, particularly critical, subset of pub-
lic health practice. These practices can be divided into preparedness and
response capabilities.
Public health preparedness capabilities involve both activities directed at
preventing possible public health emergencies and activities directed at
planning to ensure an adequate response if an emergency occurs. Rel-
evant public health preparedness activities include the following:
■ Regulating environmental conditions and food and water safety to
minimize disease threats. Public health officials assure healthy condi-
tions through a number of mechanisms, including setting standards for
health and safety, inspecting food production and importation facilities,
monitoring environmental conditions, abating conditions that foster
infectious disease (for example, insect and animal control), and enforc-
ing private-sector compliance with established standards. This range of
activities helps to lessen the likelihood that a biological or chemical
threat will lead to disease. Whether naturally occurring or initiated by
man, these disease threats can be ameliorated through rigorous moni-
toring and enforcement activities.
■ Planning for emergency medical and public health response capabili-
ties. Although strong prevention measures are an important role of
public health, it is not feasible to eliminate all biological or chemical
disease threats. Therefore, public health officials must also engage in
planning exercises to ensure that, in the event of a public health emer-
gency, emergency medical services are available to treat the sick and
public health interventions can be mobilized to minimize the spread of
disease and disability throughout the population. These planning
activities include monitoring available response resources, establishing
action protocols, simulating emergency events to improve readiness,
training public and private-sector personnel, assessing communication
capabilities, supplies, and resources, and maintaining relationships with
partner organizations to improve coordination.
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If a public health emergency does occur, public health plays an impor-
tant, but not exclusive role, in responding to the emergency. Relevant
public health response capabilities include:
■ Detecting a disease outbreak. Although some public health emergen-
cies will be readily apparent, others may not manifest themselves imme-
diately. Given that exposed persons may seek medical care in multiple
locations, it may be difficult for individual medical practitioners to
recognize that a widespread disease epidemic is occurring. This is why
regular, prompt reporting of disease cases to public health officials is
critical.15  Public health authorities are in a position to collect reports of
disease from multiple parties and can analyze these reports for trends
and anomalies. Public health officials may use sophisticated analytic
tools such as pattern recognition software and geographic information
systems to determine patterns in disease cases. Such disease surveillance
activities help to ensure that disease outbreaks are identified quickly and
that appropriate response actions, such as the issuance of health alerts for
area providers and communication with response partners, are initiated.
Although passive disease surveillance systems (that is, relying on provid-
ers to initiate disease reports) predominate, public health officials also
engage in active surveillance, wherein staff proactively seek information
from providers and others to monitor disease trends. Such active systems
are likely to be triggered and expanded in the event of a public health
emergency.
■ Conducting epidemiological investigations to ascertain the nature of
a disease epidemic. While the data collected through ongoing surveil-
lance activities can signal the advent of a public health emergency,
serving as a “red flag” for public health officials, it is likely that addi-
tional information will be needed to ascertain the identity, source, and
modes of transmission of the disease agent. Epidemiological investiga-
tions seek to determine what is causing the disease, how the disease is
spreading, and who is at risk. Answers to these questions are necessary
to identify appropriate, effective public health interventions. To get these
answers, epidemiologists and other trained public health staff act as
“disease detectives.” They contact patients identified through case
reports and ask them a variety of questions seeking to identify how they
contracted the disease. They explore where the persons were, who they
had contact with, what they ate, what they drank. As “leads” on possible
sources of exposure emerge, epidemiologists will also take samples from
suspected disease transmission vehicles (for example, food, water, soil,
and air) and specimens from patients to assist in their investigations.
These investigations are very resource-intensive and require significant
manpower to follow multiple leads and potential contacts.
■ Performing laboratory analyses to support surveillance and epide-
miology. Laboratory services support surveillance and epidemiology in
a number of ways. In many instances, clinical laboratories will diag-
nose a case of disease, identify the disease agent, and forward these
results to a public health lab for confirmation. This report into the
Some public health
emergencies may not
manifest themselves
immediately.
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disease surveillance system may represent the first step in identifying a
disease outbreak. In other instances, more sophisticated laboratory
analyses (for example, serotyping, DNA fingerprinting, and antibiotic
susceptibility testing) must be performed to identify the disease agent or
explore the characteristics of those agents. Many clinical laboratories
may lack the capacity to perform these tests, particularly for rare or
unusual diseases. In these cases, specimens will be sent to a state public
health laboratory or a federal Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) “reference” laboratory for analysis and confirmation. Tests
like serotyping (which determines the antigenic profile of a microorgan-
ism) and DNA fingerprinting help to identify not only the type of
microorganism causing an infectious disease, but also pinpoint the
particular strain of bacterium or virus involved. Such information helps
epidemiologists determine if reported disease cases are part of the same
epidemic (and therefore linked in terms of disease source) or if they
represent separate, unrelated outbreaks. Such molecular fingerprinting
techniques also support criminal investigations, as they can be used to
trace the origin of a particular strain of microorganism. Public health
labs also provide specialized protective laboratory equipment and
facilities. If a highly dangerous agent is suspected, such as smallpox,
special biocontainment equipment and procedures (for example,
Biosafety Level 4) must be used to conduct testing; only a small number
of labs maintain these capabilities.
■ Pursuing public health interventions to limit the spread of disease.
Once a disease source is identified, public health authorities initiate
actions to limit the spread of the disease. These actions involve impos-
ing temporary or permanent barriers around sources of contamination
(for example, sealing buildings, closing restaurants, and cutting off
water supplies). Under severe circumstances, public health officials can
issue quarantine16  and isolation orders that limit human travel and
commerce with affected areas. In some cases, special emergency powers
may be triggered. Public health interventions also include educational
efforts directed at informing the public of health risks and communicat-
ing strategies for avoiding those risks (for example, notices to boil
drinking water, food safety advisories and product recalls, and safe
practices for handling mail).
■ Assuring the provision of emergency medical treatment and prophy-
laxis. While the goal of public health is to initiate actions to prevent the
widespread dissemination of disease, emergencies do occur in which
large numbers of persons are exposed to and stricken with a biological
or chemical disease agent. Although the private-sector health care
system is likely to have a major role in providing the treatment services
required to respond to a public health emergency, public health au-
thorities are often responsible for coordinating, advising, and oversee-
ing the delivery of those services. Countermeasures such as antibiotics,
antitoxins, and chemical antidotes must be administered to the sick,
preventive treatments, such as prophylactic antibiotics and vaccines must
10
NHPF Background Paper April 3, 2002
be administered to those at risk, and mental health services must be
provided to those affected. Health care providers must be prepared to
perform decontamination and triage of those seeking care, to minimize
further disease exposure. In the event of a public health emergency that
results in mass casualties, the resources of a particular locality become
quickly overwhelmed, necessitating the mobilization of regional and
federal assistance. Public health authorities help to assure adequate
emergency medical service capabilities by educating health care provid-
ers about disease threats and appropriate clinical interventions, coordi-
nating regional planning and preparedness activities, and, in some
instances, delivering services directly to supplement private-sector
capacity (for example, mass immunizations). As the recent anthrax
attacks illustrate, even an event resulting in a small number of confirmed
disease cases can put enormous strains on the health care system. The
number of people potentially exposed to the disease threat and in need of
prophylactic care can be quite large relative to the number that actually
contract the disease and require treatment.
■ Remediating environmental conditions. Public health authorities may
play a role in decontaminating the sites and facilities found to be exposed
to disease agents. The nature and extent of this decontamination will
depend in large part on the nature of the disease agent and its ability to
remain viable outside a human host or animal/insect vector.
■ Preventing secondary public health emergencies following a disaster.
In the event of a natural disaster or terrorist attack, the primary instru-
ment of mass causalities may not be biological or chemical in nature.
However, the devastation resulting from these disasters, such as the
World Trade Center bombing, leads to such a high degree of social
disruption and impaired infrastructure that conditions can emerge that
foster secondary infectious disease and toxicity threats. For example,
the mass evacuation of the area around the World Trade Center led to
the abandonment of food supplies in surrounding homes and restau-
rants. Public health officials in New York City took steps to secure these
premises to avoid the proliferation of rodents and other pests that could
have resulted in secondary health threats.
Bioterrorism threats represent a particularly challenging type of public
health emergency. Biological or chemical disease threats that are inten-
tionally launched by criminals differ from naturally occurring disease
threats in a number of ways:
■ Bioterrorism is a crime and prevention and response will include
criminal justice, military, and intelligence agencies, who are not likely
to be involved in naturally occurring disease outbreaks. In fact, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has lead responsibility for responding
to a bioterrorism attack.
■ Bioterrorism attacks are likely to involve disease agents that occur
infrequently in nature. Therefore, public health officials and clinicians
Biological or chemical
disease threats inten-
tionally launched by
criminals differ from
naturally occurring
disease threats in a
number of ways.
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probably have very limited experience with these diseases. In fact, there
is some evidence that foreign powers have developed genetically
engineered chimeras (for example, microorganisms created in laborato-
ries to blend the pathogenic qualities of multiple disease agents).17
These organisms do not exist in nature and would be completely
unknown to public health and medical experts.
■ Biological or chemical threats initiated by man are not likely to
follow known epidemiological patterns. Because the transmission of the
disease is being intentionally manipulated, past experience with dis-
ease transmission and manifestation may not be predictive.
■ Bioterrorism attacks may be covert, with the terrorist expending
great energy and attention to assure the delayed discovery of the
disease to maximize the population’s exposure.
■ Outbreaks may occur in multiple locations simultaneously, a circum-
stance less likely to occur in a natural epidemic. Such a dynamic would
tax federal resources to provide support to multiple states and local
jurisdictions.
While bioterrorism threats represent a particularly frightening stimu-
lus for public health emergency preparedness, it is important to recog-
nize that naturally occurring infectious diseases and chemical exposures
can pose equally grave dangers for the American public. New diseases
(for example, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, Ebola, and West Nile)
are constantly emerging, and other diseases (for example, TB and ma-
laria) reemerge in drug-resistant form.18  Given the intrinsic nature of
microbes and their ability to quickly evolve and adapt to the changing
environment, the precise nature of the next public health emergency
cannot be predicted. It could be rooted in an intentional act or it could
result from the chance mutation of an avian strain of influenza virus,
leading to a particularly virulent and contagious influenza pandemic.
This concept of multiple threats and unknown hazards has led many
experts to advocate for a robust public health infrastructure capable of
responding to many types of emergencies. The public health infrastruc-
ture represents the capacities and resources that enable the provision of
public health services.19  Clearly, preparing for and responding to a
bioterrorism attack or other public health emergency will involve a wide
range of professional disciplines, in addition to public health. Defense,
intelligence, law enforcement, public safety, and medical resources must
all be brought to bear to minimize the threat of bioterrorism and other
public health emergencies. The focus of this paper, however, is on the
role of the public health infrastructure in ensuring homeland security.
THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Public health practice obviously involves activities wherein government
must intercede in the lives of its citizens. The authority for these incur-
sions in people’s private lives stems from the statutes, regulations, and
The public health infra-
structure represents
the capacities and re-
sources that enable the
provision of public
health services.
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case law that constitute public health law. Public health law represents
the basis for public health practice, as well as an instrument through which
public health interventions are implemented. In his seminal work, Public
Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, Lawrence O. Gostin defines public health
law as “the legal powers and duties of the state to assure the conditions
for people to be healthy...and the limitations on the power of the state to
constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, propriety, or other legally pro-
tected interests of individuals for the protection or promotion of commu-
nity health.”20
Constitutional Foundation
Gostin finds that government’s special responsibilities in matters of pub-
lic health are rooted in the constitutional design. He notes that the Pre-
amble to the Constitution establishes the legislative power to provide for
the “common defence” and “general welfare” of the United States and
reveals a clear intent to vest power in government to protect community
health and safety. In discussing the application of constitutional law to
public health, Gostin states:
The Constitution serves three primary functions: to allocate power be-
tween the federal government and the states (federalism), to divide power
among the branches of government (separation of powers), and to limit
government power (protection of individual liberties)....the Constitution
acts as both a fountain and a levee: it originates the flow of power (to
preserve the public health) and curbs that power (to protect individual
freedoms).
Each of these principles—federalism, separation of powers, and protec-
tion of individual liberties—has important implications for the practice
of public health.
■ Federalism. The Constitution establishes a balance of power among
federal and state governments, granting the federal government only
specific enumerated powers. The power to tax and spend and the
power to govern interstate commerce are the enumerated powers most
relevant to public health law. In contrast, the Constitution grants the
states all the authority necessary to govern, provided it is neither
expressly granted to the federal government nor prohibited to the
states. Article VI of the Constitution contains the Supremacy Clause,
which allows Congress to preempt state public health laws in those
areas where the Constitution establishes federal authority.
■ Separation of powers. In addition to providing the foundation for the
sharing of power between the federal government and the states, the
Constitution also divides power among the three branches of govern-
ment: Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary. Congress
enacts federal public health policy and appropriates the resources to
implement that policy. Executive agencies implement public health
legislation and establish complex regulations to advance the policy
The principles of fed-
eralism, separation of
power, and protection
of individual liberties
have  important impli-
cations for the practice
of public health.
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goals articulated by the legislature. The judiciary interprets laws and
resolves legal disputes, establishing legal precedents through case law.
As Gostin notes “the courts have exerted substantial control over public
health policy by determining the boundaries of government power...
[deciding] whether public health statute is constitutional, whether
agency action is authorized by legislation, whether agency officials
have marshaled sufficient evidence to support their actions, and
whether government officials and private parties have acted negli-
gently.”21 The separation of powers doctrine establishes checks and
balances to ensure that public health (and other laws) are politically
accountable and do not overreach.
■ Limited powers. The Constitution also limits government power for
the purpose of protecting individual liberties. Public health laws and
interventions directed at promoting the public good (for example,
isolation and quarantine, regulation of pharmaceutical products, and
food safety regulation) frequently infringe on the rights and freedoms
of individuals and businesses. The constitutional design seeks to
balance the need to vest power in government to promote the common
good with the need to protect individual liberties. In seeking this
balance with respect to public health law, the courts have generally
found public health interventions permissible, provided they are
necessary to prevent avoidable harm, represent a reasonable means to
achieve the public health objective, are proportional to the public health
threat, do not cause harm to those required to submit to compulsory
measures, offer appropriate due process protections, and provide equal
protection under the law.22
Federal Statute and Regulations
Although theoretically limited by the Constitution, the federal govern-
ment has far reaching power to influence public health through its pow-
ers to (a) tax and spend and (b) regulate interstate and international com-
merce.23 Taxation policy provides an indirect means for influencing the
behavior of individuals and businesses through tax relief (for example,tax
incentives to promote pharmaceutical research for rare diseases) or tax
burdens (for example, tobacco excise taxes). Spending policy authorizes
expenditures for public health activities, including activities that go be-
yond those federal powers enumerated in the Constitution. Because Con-
gress has the power to prescribe the terms upon which federal funds will
flow to the states (provided these terms are clearly articulated in statute
and a relationship exists between the conditions imposed and the pur-
pose of the grant), spending policy can also be used to encourage state
conformance to federal statutory or regulatory standards.
The Constitution’s Commerce Clause affords the federal government con-
siderable power to establish public health regulations. Although the Com-
merce Clause is limited to controlling the flow of goods and services across
Spending policy can
encourage state con-
formance to federal
standards.
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state lines, modern interpretations of it have been broad. As the economy
has become national (and even global) in scale, it is increasingly difficult to
identify commerce activities that are not interstate in nature. Therefore, the
Constitution grants the federal government with direct, far reaching au-
thority to enact public health laws and regulations, including those related
to safe food, clean water, safe and effective pharmaceutical products, and
healthy environmental conditions.24
Federal public health statutes are largely expressed through the Public
Health Service Act; the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act; the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act; the Clean Air Act; and other related statutes. In gen-
eral, the Public Health Service Act authorizes the activities of the public
health service agencies and creates important vehicles for federal funding
of public health activities in states and communities. The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to di-
rectly regulate the safety of food and cosmetics and the safety and effec-
tiveness of pharmaceuticals, biologics, and medical devices. The National
Environmental Policy Act and related environmental statutes authorize the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate the safety of the air,
the water, and the ecological system. These legal frameworks are impor-
tant because they establish the FDA and the EPA as regulatory agencies,
while the CDC and other agencies of the Public Health Service influence
state and local public health practices largely through funding decisions,
technical assistance, and advisory consultation.
Although the CDC’s involvement in public health activities is largely
nonregulatory, the Public Health Services Act does contain some provi-
sions for federal authorities in responding to epidemics. Sections 361
through 369 of the Public Health Service Act authorize the surgeon gen-
eral to make and enforce regulations to prevent the introduction or spread
of communicable diseases from foreign countries and from one state to
another and vests the surgeon general with powers to inspect, seize prop-
erty, and quarantine persons. DHHS is currently reviewing its legislative
authorities and regulations to ensure that they are adequate and appro-
priate to respond to contemporary public health threats.
Certain provisions of federal code specifically address federal assistance
to states and localities under emergency circumstances. The Stafford Act
(42 U.S.C. 5170 et seq.) establishes provisions for federal assistance to states
in the event of a disaster. The act requires the governor of the affected
state to request a declaration of a disaster and vests the president with
the authority to make such a declaration and charge federal agencies to
provide support to state and local efforts. The Public Health Threats and
Emergency Act of 2000 gives the secretary of health and human services
the authority to identify a public health emergency, take action to respond,
and establishes a Public Health Emergency Fund to support emergency
response efforts. Bioterrorism preparedness legislation (H.R. 3448) cur-
rently being considered by conference committee builds on the authori-
ties established under the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act.
15
NHPF Background Paper April 3, 2002
State Law and Local Ordinances
Although federal authority for public health matters has become fairly sweep-
ing in modern times, the states have primary responsibility for protecting
the health and welfare of their citizenry. The Constitution recognizes the
states’ sovereignty to safeguard the public’s welfare and provides for two
specific powers, the power to regulate private interest for the public good
(commonly referred to as police power) and the parens patriae power to de-
fend the interests of persons unable to secure their own interests. These pow-
ers give states broad latitude in determining the nature and characteristics
of their governmental public health system.25
Given that states have a high degree of discretion in establishing public
health law, bounded only by the U.S. and state constitutions, it is not
surprising that a wide variety of approaches have emerged from state
legislatures. States have pursued different paths in defining their role in
public health, including determining the breadth and depth of govern-
ment interventions, establishing the degree to which public health au-
thority is delegated to local governments, and identifying the organiza-
tional framework for state public health functions.
Scope and Content of State Public Health Statutes — In defining the
parameters of public health, states have established statutory definitions
of the concept and have legislatively delineated the powers and duties of
state and local public health officials.26  In general, state public health stat-
utes and the case law that interprets them provide public health authori-
ties with the power to collect data, license businesses and health care de-
livery facilities, conduct inspections, and engage in enforcement activi-
ties (including control of persons and property).27
However, the legal basis and specific provisions governing these func-
tions varies substantially by state. For example, in some states the spe-
cific conditions and diseases subject to compulsory reporting are identi-
fied in statute, and additions or modifications require legislative action.
In other states, state health departments are vested with the authority to
define the diseases and information that must be reported to state offi-
cials. Because states establish the specific circumstances under which re-
porting occurs and the procedures for such reporting, it is not surprising
that communicable disease data vary across states. Similarly, licensing
requirements, inspection standards and protocols, and enforcement au-
thorities and remedies differ from state to state.28  Researchers have found
a wide range of congruence among states’ public health enabling legisla-
tion and the missions and functions set forth in the ten essential services
of public health.29
Delegation of Authority to Local Public Health Officials — Local govern-
ments derive all of their power and authority from the state. States have
taken very different approaches to the delegation of public health duties
to local governments. Some states provide local governments with very
States have primary re-
sponsibility for protect-
ing the public’s health
and welfare.
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limited authority, while others offer local jurisdiction “home rule” over
public health matters. Absent delegations of power provided under state
constitutions, states may modify or remove home rule powers of local gov-
ernments at will. Such home rule provisions empower local governments
to enact ordinances and establish fees, and may prescribe the governance
structure for health departments (for example, local boards of health).30
Some states have established statutes that explicitly allow local public health
agencies (LPHAs) to form intergovernmental compacts to consolidate public
health services across political jurisdictions.
In general, distribution of public health authority can be classified into three
categories: (a) a centralized approach in which state agencies have exten-
sive legal and operational control over local authorities, (b) a decentralized
approach in which local governments are delegated significant control, and
(c) a hybrid approach in which some public health responsibilities are pro-
vided directly by the state, while others are assumed by localities.31  Table 1
summarizes the approach taken by each of the states.
While the information presented in Table 1 provides a general overview
of state approaches, delegation of specific powers may differ from the
general approach pursued. For example, although Arizona, Indiana, and
Utah generally pursue a decentralized approach to the delegation of public
health authority, these states do not delegate authority for issuing quar-
antine orders to local public health officials.32
Total
11
17
22
Brief Description
State public health agency either performs
directly or regulates the level and extent
of public health services provided at the
local level
Authority and direct responsibility of many
public health functions lie at the local level
of government
Direct responsibility for public health
functions are shared between state and local
government
TABLE 1
State Approaches to Delegation of Public Health Authority
Distributional
Approach
Centralized
Decentralized
Hybrid
States
AR, DE*,FL, HI*, LA, MS, NM,
RI*, SC, VA, VT*
AZ, CO, CT, ID, IN, IA, ME, MO,
MT, NE, NV, NJ, ND, OR, UT, WA,
WI
AL, AK, CA, GA, IL, KA, KY, MD,
MA, MI, MN, NH, NC, NY, OH,
OK, PA, SD, TN, TX WV,WY
*State-run systems that do not classify their field offices as local health departments.
Source: Lawrence O. Gostin and J. G. Hodge, State Public Health Law—Assessment Report, unpublished paper sponsored by the Turning Point Public
Health Statute Modernization National Collaborative, July 2001, 26; supplemented by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Profile of State and
Territorial Public Health Systems. Table based on George E. Pickett and John Hanlon, Public Health Administration and Practice, 108 (1990).
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Modernization of State Public Health Statutes — State public health
statutes are not generally organized in a coherent structure. Rather, state
public health legislation has been enacted in a piecemeal fashion as new
public health threats have become identified.33  In The Future of Public
Health, the IOM recommended that states review their public health stat-
utes to ensure that basic authorities are clearly delineated, modern dis-
ease control measures are supported, and appropriate due process safe-
guards are incorporated. Although nearly 20 state legislatures have con-
sidered additions or changes to their statutory public health laws in re-
cent years,34  many of the laws currently on the books reflect a very dated
perspective on government’s role in public health interventions.35
Seeking to stimulate the modernization of public health law, the Turning
Point Public Health Statute Modernization National Collaborative is de-
veloping a Model State Public Health Act. This collaborative represents a
broad coalition of public health organizations, including the National As-
sociation of City and County Health Officers (NACCHO), the Association
of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO), the National Governors
Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the Na-
tional Association of Local Boards of Health. The collaborative found that
public health law reform is necessary to update antiquated laws, keep
pace with scientific developments, comply with modern constitutional
requirements, clarify powers and duties, and stimulate public health dia-
logue with policymakers.36
Expected to be completed in the summer of 2003, the model law is ex-
pected to be divided into 12 articles:
■ Presentation of legislative findings.
■ Definition of public health mission and functions.
■ Delineation of the fundamental capabilities required to support the
mission (that is, data systems, workforce, organizational structure,
financing, and research capacity).
■ Identification of public and private partners.
■ Identification of conditions of public health importance.
■ Statement of public health authorities and powers (for example,
disease control and prevention, environmental health services, licensing
and permits, administrative searches and inspections, and nuisance
abatement).
■ Clarification of emergency powers.
■ Statement of administrative procedures.
■ Provision to protect the privacy of public health information.
■ Provision to ensure nondiscrimination in public health.
■ Establishment of enforcement and sovereign immunity.
■ Miscellaneous provisions related to severability, repeals, conflicting
laws, and reports.
Many laws currently
on the books reflect a
dated perspective on
government’s role in
public health.
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In a related effort, the CDC funded the Center for Law and the Public’s
Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities to develop a Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act. The current draft of the model law
provides an outline of the issues state policymakers must assess as they
consider the adequacy of their existing emergency powers statutes, in-
cluding measures to detect and track potential and existing public health
emergencies, provisions to define and declare a public health emergency,
powers to control property and persons during a state of emergency, re-
quirements related to public communication, and provisions to mandate
planning for an emergency.37
Some critics of this draft model law maintain that government has the
inherent powers to deal with crisis situations and this statutory language
is unnecessary. Others have identified gaps in the model language related
to the regulation of health care financing (for example, the power of insur-
ers to exclude from coverage treatments related to public health emergen-
cies).38  Civil rights advocates have also voiced concerns that the model
statute tilts too much toward public health powers at the expense of indi-
vidual civil liberties.39  Defenders of the effort have countered that a sub-
stantive debate about public health authorities must occur in state legisla-
tures and this model statute provides a comprehensive road map for dis-
cussing important, yet potentially controversial, issues. These issues in-
clude defining who can declare a public health emergency and the cir-
cumstances under which this action can be taken, the extent of govern-
ment power to detain individuals and seize property, and the balance of
decision-making authority between governors and state legislatures. At
least 29 state legislatures have indicated that public health preparedness
will be a priority for the 2002 legislative session.40
WHO’S WHO? ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Public health services and activities have historically been grounded in
state authority, as the preceding section suggests. While rooted in state-
based policy, the public health system is complex, involving multiple play-
ers across all levels of government as well as collaborative relationships
with the private sector. Federal, state, and local public health agencies
work together in partnership to deliver public health services. Given the
complexity of these relationships and the level of variation across states,
it is extremely difficult to definitively characterize the relative contribu-
tions among federal, state, and local public health agencies (Figure 1).
The National Health Accounts published by DHHS estimate that $41.1
billion were spent on governmental public health activities in 1999, ex-
cluding funding for biomedical research, environmental programs, and
personal health care services. Federal funding accounted for nearly 11
At least 29 state legis-
latures have indicated
that public health pre-
paredness will be a
priority in 2002.
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percent of total public health spending ($4.4 billion), with state and local
government providing the majority of financial support (approximately
89 percent).41
Studies of state expenditures yield different estimates, indicating that
federal funding plays a stronger role in supporting state and local activi-
ties than the National Health Accounts suggest. Based on data from the
early 1990s, the Public Health Foundation estimated that federal fund-
ing accounted for 32 percent of public health expenditures within the
sample of states studied, with state and local sources contributing 50
and 16 percent of funding respectively.42  It should be noted that state
contributions to public health vary widely across states and the Public
Health Foundation did not claim that the nine states selected in their
sample were statistically representative of all states.
A review of LPHA funding provides yet a different perspective. A re-
cent NACCHO survey of LPHAs found that local governments contrib-
ute 44 percent of LPHA funding, with state support (including federal
pass-throughs) representing 30 percent of funding, and direct federal
support representing 3 percent. Service reimbursements and other rev-
enue sources constitute the remaining 23 percent.43  NACCHO’s budget
FIGURE 1
Public Health Spending by Source of Funds
 at National, State, and Local Levels (in percent)
State* Local*
State/Local
89%
Federal
11%
Local
16%
State
50%
Federal
32%
Service
Reimbursement
23%
Local
44%
State
(including
federal
passthroughs)
30%
Federal 3%
*All governmental public health
expenditures made in the United States for
population-based public health services,
excluding biomedical research.
Source: 1999 National Health Accounts,
Office of the Actuary, Health Care
Financing Administration, U.S.
Department of Health and Human
Services.
*All governmental public health
expenditures made within the states for
population-based public health, including
those made at the local level (does not
include expenditures made at the federal
level but not passed through to states, e.g.,
CDC laboratories).
Source: Public Health Foundation,
Measuring Expenditures for Essential
Public Health Service.
*All expenditures for local public health
departments (both population-based and
personal health care services).
Source: National Association of County
and City Health Officials, Local Public
Health Infrastructure.
National*
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summaries are not limited to population-based services and include the
personal health services delivered by LPHAs, accounting for the large
proportion of expenditures funded through service reimbursments. The
seeming discrepancies observed in local/state contributions between the
NACCHO and the Public Health Foundation studies likely result from
expenditures that are made only at the state level (for example, state labo-
ratory support). The expenses associated with these activities performed
directly by state government are accounted for in the states’ share of pub-
lic health funding in the Public Health Foundation analysis, but they are
not represented in the local health agency budgets reviewed by NACCHO.
Although the precise contribution of each level of government to the public
health infrastructure is difficult to quantify, the available data confirm
that public health is primarily a state-sponsored and -funded activity,
with federal and local agencies playing significant roles.
Federal Agencies
A recent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report identified over
20 federal departments and agencies as having a role in preparing for
or responding to a bioterrorist attack.44  While bioterrorism attacks rep-
resent a single type of potential public health emergency, GAO’s re-
view of bioterrorism preparedness programs represents an inclusive
overview of the multiple federal agencies that would have a role in any
public health emergency. The Federal Response Plan,45  which defines
how the federal government will respond to domestic situations in
which the president has declared an emergency requiring federal di-
saster assistance, identifies DHHS as the primary federal agency re-
sponsible for the medical and public health response to emergencies
(including major disasters and terrorist events).
DHHS discharges these responsibilities through several operating divi-
sions, including the following:
■ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The CDC works with
state public health agencies to detect, investigate, and prevent the
spread of disease in communities. The CDC provides support to state
public health agencies in a variety of ways, including financial assis-
tance, training programs, technical assistance and expert consultation,
sophisticated laboratory services, research activities, and standards
development.
■ Food and Drug Administration. The FDA has responsibilities both
for ensuring the safety of the food supply and for assuring the safety
and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, biologics, and medical devices. The
FDA fulfills its food safety responsibilities in partnership with the
Department of Agriculture which is responsible for the safety of meat,
poultry, and processed egg products.
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■ National Institutes of Health (NIH). The NIH conducts and supports
biomedical research, including research targeted at the development of
rapid diagnostics and new and more effective vaccines and antimicrobial
therapies.
■ Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). Housed within the Office
of the Secretary, the OEP is responsible for coordinating emergency
medical response in the event of a public health emergency. OEP
coordinates both the National Disaster Medical Service and the Metro-
politan Medical Response System.
■ Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). HRSA admin-
isters the state grant program to facilitate regional hospital preparedness
planning and to upgrade the capacity of hospitals and other health care
facilities to respond to public health emergencies. HRSA is also generally
responsible for health care workforce development.
A variety of other federal agencies have organizational responsibilities re-
lated to bioterrorism and public health emergency preparedness. The Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency respon-
sible for coordinating federal aid for any disaster that prompts federal as-
sistance through the Stafford Act. The EPA is responsible for responding to
emergencies involving chemicals and other hazardous substances. The
Department of Defense supports public health preparedness through its
research on bioweapons, intelligence gathering on bioterrorism threats, and
civil support functions in the event of an emergency that results in severe
social unrest. The Department of Justice has lead responsibility for assess-
ing and investigating terrorist threats and provides funds and assistance to
emergency responders (for example, police, fire, and rescue personnel) at
state and local levels. The Department of Veterans Affairs purchases drugs
and other therapeutics for the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and op-
erates one of the nation’s largest health care systems, which could provide
critical surge capacity in the event of a mass causality event. Several other
federal agencies, including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce,
and Energy also have potential roles to play in preparing for and respond-
ing to a public health emergency. A more detailed summary of federal
agency roles and responsibilities is presented in Appendix A.
The GAO found that although efforts have been made to better coordi-
nate federal efforts to combat terrorism, significant fragmentation con-
tinues to exist. The congressionally established Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction (also known as the Gilmore Commission) also concluded that
existing coordination mechanisms fail to provide adequate authority and
accountability.46  The GAO raised particular concerns about the range of
agencies providing assistance to state and local governments and recom-
mended consolidation of some emergency planning efforts under FEMA.
Although multiple agencies provide federal funding for emergency pre-
paredness, federal support for the public health infrastructure at the state
Although efforts have
been made to better
coordinate federal ef-
forts to combat terror-
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and local levels is drawn largely from grants and cooperative agreements
with the CDC. Some of these funding streams represent nondirected
mechanisms, such as the Preventive Services Block Grant, a flexible grant
that supports states’ efforts to prevent morbidity and mortality. ASTHO
estimated that approximately 9 percent of Preventive Health Service Block
Grant dollars are allocated by states to infectious disease prevention and
control activities ($12.15 million out of $135 million total block grant fund-
ing).47  However, most CDC grants to states are categorical in nature, fo-
cusing on specific diseases or activities. Categorical grants and coopera-
tive agreements that have supported the public health infrastructure (and
indirectly contribute to emergency preparedness activities, given the dual
use nature of many of these investments) include those related to STDs,
TB, HIV/AIDS, immunizations, epidemiology and laboratory capacity,
and environmental health.
Some of these categorical grants are awared to all 50 states. Others re-
semble demonstration projects that seek to develop and test more ad-
vanced capabilities. These demonstration/research grants are awarded
on a competitive basis and may be expanded to additional states as funds
become available. For example, the Emerging Infections Program pro-
vides funding to nine states to conduct sophisticated, active surveillance
on food-borne illnesses and other emerging infectious diseases. An over-
view of key CDC  and other relevant DHHS programs is presented in
Appendix B.
While a detailed accounting of these many funding vehicles is not readily
available, CDC funding for state and local preparedness had been lim-
ited prior to the infusion of funding provided for in the fiscal year (FY)
2002 appropriations. Beginning in 1999, CDC was appropriated dollars
expressly to support bioterrorism preparedness activities. In FY 2001,
$180.9 million was appropriated for these efforts, with $66.7 million allo-
cated to building state and local preparedness. In the wake of September
11 and the anthrax attacks, increased concerns regarding homeland secu-
rity led to a $2.1 billion FY 2002 appropriation for CDC’s anti-terrorism
activities, over a ten-fold increase from FY 2001 levels. The FY 2002 supple-
mental appropriations targeted $865 million to upgrading state and local
capacity, which, combined with dollars from CDC’s regular appropria-
tion, resulted in $917 million for grants to states and localities. The first
installment of this funding, approximately 20 percent of the total, was
made to states in mid-February.
State Agencies
As does the federal government, most states rely on multiple agencies to
deliver public health emergency services. These functions tend to be con-
centrated within a limited number of agencies at the state level. Most
public health emergency preparedness functions are typically housed
within a state health agency or department of health. The majority of
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states (35) have freestanding state health agencies, while the remainder
of states have consolidated public health organizations into “super agen-
cies” that are responsible for a wide range of activities (for example, hu-
man services).48
Public health preparedness functions that are often organizationally sepa-
rate from the primary state health agency include environmental health
services and emergency medical services. Most states (36) have an envi-
ronmental health agency that is separate from the state health agency.49
Although these states may have a small environmental health section
within the health agency, the environmental health agency is charged
with monitoring environmental contaminants and remediating hazard-
ous conditions. Similarly, in at least seven states, the state health agency
is not responsible for emergency medical services (EMS). States that sepa-
rate EMS from other public health functions typically house EMS activi-
ties in a department of public safety or in freestanding EMS authorities
or boards.50  In responding to a public health emergency, the state health
agency would work collaboratively with the environmental agency and
emergency medical services agency (if separated organizationally), as
well as with state law enforcement, public safety, and transportation agen-
cies and, possibly, the National Guard.
As the preceding section on public health law discussed, states vary con-
siderably in the nature and scope of the public health services they pro-
vide. States differ both in the breadth and depth of services provided
within their jurisdictions and the degree to which public health service
delivery responsibilities are delegated to local governments. In general,
however, state governments are ultimately responsible for responding to
a public health emergency and tend to play certain key roles in prepared-
ness and response, regardless of how decentralized a particular public
health system might be. Except in the largest metropolitan local public
health departments, local public health officials will tend to rely on state
personnel and capacity for a number of key functions, including provid-
ing advanced laboratory capacity and epidemiological expertise and serv-
ing as a conduit for federal assistance.
States vary considerably in the amount of funding they contribute to public
health. Although there are no current centralized data on state health
budgets, data from the late 1980s suggest that some states, such as Colo-
rado, rely heavily on federal funding and contribute relatively few state
dollars. Other states, such as California and New York, make investments
that far exceed federal support.51  Past efforts to document state varia-
tions in per capita spending on public health were stymied by both tech-
nical challenges in resolving the many ways states organize and define
public health and political sensitivities to making explicit cross-state com-
parisons. Although anecdotal accounts confirm that the patterns observed
in older data continue to be true, systematic national reporting of state
investments in public health have not occurred in over a decade.
States vary consider-
ably in the resources
they contribute to
public health.
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State funds for public health expenditures are derived from many sources,
including distributions from general revenues, specific set-asides based on
ad valorem (real property) taxes or sales taxes, fees (for example, fees for
distribution of vital statistic records and licensure fees), settlement funds
(for example, tobacco settlement), reimbursement for services (for example,
third party payment for immunizations), and philanthropic donations.
Local Public Health Agencies
In general, LPHAs are on the “front line” in responding to public health
emergencies and must work collaboratively with other “first respond-
ers,” such as fire and rescue personnel, emergency medical service pro-
viders, law enforcement officers, hazardous materials teams, physicians,
and hospitals in preparing for and managing the consequences of those
emergencies. Although the relationships between state and local public
health agencies vary substantially across the country, in most states sig-
nificant responsibilities have been delegated to localities.
A recent survey conducted by NACCHO estimated that there are currently
2,912 local health departments in the United States.52  The majority of these
LPHAs are county-based (60 percent), with the remainder divided among
city-based (10 percent), city-county (7 percent), township (15 percent), and
multicounty (8 percent) configurations. The populations served by these
LPHAs vary considerably, with 50 percent of LPHAs serving populations
of fewer than 25,000 persons, 19 percent serving 25,000 to 49,999 persons,
13 percent serving 50,000 to 99,999 persons, 14 percent serving 100,000 to
499,999 persons, and 4 percent serving over 500,000 persons.53
The service offerings of LPHAs also vary substantially, with LPHAs serv-
ing larger populations more likely to offer a wide range of services. A
comprehensive summary of services provided by LPHAs is presented
in Appendix C.54  Focusing on the services most directly related to emer-
gency preparedness, the vast majority of LPHAs have responsibilities
for epidemiology and surveillance (84 percent), communicable disease
control measures (94 percent), food safety (85 percent), and restaurant
inspections (80 percent). LPHAs are less likely to be responsible for labo-
ratory services (45 percent), air quality (44 percent), vector control (61
percent), animal control (40 percent), water inspections (44 percent), or
emergency medical response (61 percent).
In those cases where the LPHA is not responsible for these services, they
are typically delivered by a sister local government agency (for example,
an environmental services agency) or the state. When services are offered
by an LPHA, the breadth and depth of those services may vary quite
extensively. For example, although nearly half of LPHAs report provid-
ing laboratory services, these services may be quite limited in nature (for
example, to support TB and STD testing). Many LPHAs who report hav-
ing laboratory services are likely to rely on state public health labs for
more specialized diagnostic needs.
In most states, signifi-
cant responsibilities
have been delegated
to localities.
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The workforce of the LPHA varies significantly, with staffing levels ranging
from 0 full-time equivalent staff (FTEs) to 5,600 FTEs. The mean FTE staff-
ing complement is 67 and the median staffing level is 13. Not surprisingly,
these differences in staffing correlate strongly to the size of the populations
served by the LPHA, as shown in Table 2.55  Administrative or clerical staff,
public health nurses, and environmental scientists or specialists are the most
common occupations represented among LPHA staff.
Given the tremendous diversity in the size of LPHAs, it is not surprising
that annual expenditures vary significantly by the size of the population
served. The recent NACCHO survey of LPHAs found that annual expen-
ditures ranged from $0 in LPHAs staffed by volunteer officials to over
$836 million in large metropolitan health departments. Table 3 shows the
variation in annual expenditures by size of the population served.
NACCHO did not calculate per capita expenditures for the LPHAs who
responded to the survey.
It is important to note that these annual expenditures include funding
for the delivery of personal health care services (for example, prenatal
care clinics) and are not limited to emergency preparedness activities. A
study conducted by the Public Health Foundation found significant
variation in the percentage of LPHA expenditures devoted to personal
health care services.56  The budgets of some LPHAs, particularly those
that operate county hospitals or home health services, are dominated
by personal health care services. Although data on per capita spending
for public health emergency preparedness activities are not available,
anecdotal reports suggest significant variation in the level of local and
state contributions to preparedness efforts. Local governments
fund their contributions to LPHAs through a variety of mecha-
nisms, including general revenues, specific taxes, fines, and fees.
Some jurisdictions allow local public health authorities to raise
capital through the issuance of bonds or other securities.57
Differences in the size of population served, staffing, services,
budgets, and capabilities of local health departments depend
in part on how state governments have elected to structure
and organize local public health jurisdictions. There is tremen-
dous variation nationally in how local health departments are
configured. Both Idaho and Utah organize local public health
activities through regional health districts that serve multiple
counties. In contrast, Massachusetts has 351 local public health
jurisdictions, serving every township in the state, regardless
of size. Only ten local (city or county) health departments ex-
ist in Pennsylvania, with the balance of the state served by
four small regional offices of the state health department. In
Bergen County, New Jersey, alone there are a county health
department, 15 township health departments, and 55 boards
of health. Approximately 180 communities in the United States
are not served by a local public health authority.
TABLE 2
Local Public Health Agency
Staffing Levels
by Size of Population Served
Size of Population
0 – 24,999
25,000 – 49,999
50,000 – 99,999
100,000 – 499,999
500,000+
Staffing Levels
Mean FTEs Median FTEs
13.9 8.5
31.3 18.0
57.8 41.0
150.9 110.0
612.0 437.0
National Association of County and City Health Officials,
Local Public Health Agency Infrastructure: A Chartbook,
Washington, DC, October 2001.
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Even after segmenting service offerings and staffing levels by the size of
the population served by the LPHAs, the average values that emerge can
mask significant differences within categories. As Jerry Gibson, director
of Disease Control in the South Carolina Department of Health and Envi-
ronmental Control and immediate past president of the Council of State
and Territorial Epidemiologists, noted: “public health organization and
capability are highly varied across the 51 states and 3,000 local health
departments of the United States. Some are strong, but many are very
weak....Our preparedness building cannot ignore the weak depart-
ments.”58  A recent NACCHO survey revealed that only 26 percent of
LPHAs had completed a comprehensive emergency response plan; how-
ever, over half of respondents indicated that their response plans were at
least 80 percent complete. Of those that had begun development of a com-
prehensive emergency response plan, only 12 percent indicated that a
bioterrorism portion was complete.59  In an earlier survey, only 15 percent
of local health departments indicated that they were well prepared to
respond to a public health emergency.60
Private Health Care Providers and Other Private-Sector
Partners
While government agencies play a central role in preparing for and re-
sponding to a public health emergency, the efforts of private-sector health
care providers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, agricultural producers, the
food industry, and other private-sector parties are also critical. Effective
public health preparedness depends, in large part, on alert clinicians who
are trained to recognize potential emergency situations and report these
50th Percentile
(Median)
$214,658
$600,000
$1,827,526
$5,100,000
$27,000,000
TABLE 3
Annual Expenditure Levels of Local Public Health Agencies,
by Size of Population Served, 1999
Expenditure Levels
Size of Population
0 – 24,999
25,000 – 49,999
50,000 – 99,999
100,000 – 499,999
500,000+
25th Percentile
$86,500
$302,000
$1,011,221
$3,167,936
$16,500,000
75th Percentile
$507,283
$1,400,000
$3,250,000
$10,500,000
$46,800,000
Average
$437,637
$1,227,538
$2,552,669
$7,674,500
$66,200,000
National Association of County and City Health Officials, Local Public Health Agency Infrastructure: A Chartbook,
Washington, DC, October 2001.
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suspicions to public health officials. Most individual patients who have
contracted an infectious disease or are exposed to dangerous chemicals
will first present for treatment to hospital emergency rooms or their own
physicians. These private-sector providers play a crucial role in identify-
ing threats to the general public’s health.
Every state has incorporated requirements in state statute that compel
physicians, laboratories, and other health providers to notify public health
officials when patients present for particular diseases. Some states include
a general provision that physicians should report “unusual” infectious
diseases. Despite these laws, it is fairly well-documented that compli-
ance with reportable disease requirements is low and that physicians do
not generally understand these requirements or the processes for making
reports. Even when requirements are understood, some physicians choose
to ignore them, given the effort it takes to make reports and perceptions
regarding the utility of such efforts. Reporting from laboratories that make
clinical diagnoses tends to be more complete, but concerns have been
raised regarding regional labs that have broad geographic service areas
and may not be aware of the reporting requirements in the many states
from which they receive specimens.
In addition to playing a critical role in detecting public health emergen-
cies, private providers also play a central role in responding to the medi-
cal consequences of those emergencies. Given that they will probably have
limited experience dealing with the rare disease threats typically associ-
ated with public health emergency situations, health care providers will
likely look to public health officials for clinical guidance. Under the di-
rection of public health authorities, private-sector delivery systems, hos-
pitals, physicians, pharmacies, nursing homes, and others would be mo-
bilized in the event of an emergency to provide needed treatment to those
affected by disease and to provide prophylactic care to those at risk for
exposure to disease. State and federal laws that confer tax-exempt status
on hospitals typically require those institutions to provide significant com-
munity benefit, including the provision of emergency medical services
and participation in regional emergency medical service planning. The
FY 2002 appropriations included $135 million for grants to states to con-
duct regional planning and to improve the capacity of hospitals and other
health care facilities to respond to bioterrorism.
Health care providers are not the only private-sector group contributing
to public health emergency preparedness. Although NIH makes signifi-
cant investments in the development of new vaccines and antimicrobial
agents, pharmaceutical manufacturers represent the primary source of
funding for research and development. Efforts to encourage industry in-
terest in the development of vaccines and other countermeasures include
incentives such as liability protections, antitrust waivers, patent exten-
sions, and long-term contracts. Similarly, activities to improve the safety
and security of the food supply will rely on the agricultural and food
Health care providers
will likely look to pub-
lic health officials for
clinical guidance.
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production industries to make necessary upgrades to their processes and
to seek innovative ways to minimize disease threats.
CONCLUSION
Public health emergency preparedness has become an imperative. The
existing public health system is extremely complex, both legally and
organizationally, resulting in a public health infrastructure that varies widely
from state to state and community to community. The events of September
11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks have heightened awareness that some
standard level of preparedness must be demonstrated by every commu-
nity in the country. Achieving this goal will require a tremendous degree of
resources, intergovernmental coordination, and leadership.
The FY 2002 emergency supplemental appropriations bill called on states
to prepare plans that would both assess their current capacity for respond-
ing to a public health emergency and detail the actions that would be
taken to achieve upgraded capabilities. On February 15, 2002, the CDC
issued guidance to the states for the preparation of these plans. This guid-
ance included the identification of critical and enhanced capacities and
critical benchmarks for progress in the following areas: preparedness plan-
ning and readiness assessment, surveillance and epidemiology capacity,
laboratory capacity for the diagnosis of biological agents, communica-
tions and information technology, communication of health risks and dis-
semination of health information, and education and training. For each
of these capacities, states must provide a brief description of existing ca-
pacity, an assessment of whether capacity is adequate, and a proposal for
effecting improvements in those areas judged to be inadequate. Critical
capacities must be addressed before enhanced capacities can be pursued.
In preparing these plans, which are due to the CDC by April 15, states face
a range of formidable challenges. State public health officials must quickly
and critically take stock of their existing capacities. In the face of looming
state budget deficits and possible hiring freezes, they must begin to make
significant investments in the public health infrastructure and plan for ad-
ditional longer-term improvements. They must work closely with their lo-
cal health departments to determine how best to allocate resources within
the state and must consider appropriate cross-state collaborations. They
must also consider the dual-use nature of these investments in the public
health infrastructure and make decisions that optimize the balance between
bioterrorism-focused enhancements and improvements that contribute to
broader system development and response capabilities.
Similarly, federal officials are confronted with multiple challenges. They
must assess the plans and proposals emanating from states, promote co-
ordination and highlight best practices, refine critical capacities to ensure
meaningful and measurable benchmarks for achievement, monitor imple-
mentation to ensure accountability, and develop a long-term strategic vi-
sion for ongoing improvements to the system.
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The current influx of resources and renewed attention to the public health
infrastructure has the potential to truly transform the nation’s public health
system. Unprecedented federal support and oversight may lead to more
uniform and robust public health preparedness capabilities across the
country. Although the potential is great, the obstacles are also numerous.
The sustained involvement and commitment of policymakers at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels will determine the success of these efforts.
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Appendix A
Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response:
Roles of Key Federal Agencies
Based on information compiled in “U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism:
Federal Research and Preparedness Activities,” September 2001, GAO-01-915.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
The Federal Response Plan,1  which defines how the federal government
will respond to domestic situations in which the president has declared
an emergency requiring federal disaster assistance, identifies the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) as the primary federal agency
responsible for the medical and public health response to emergencies
(including major disasters and terrorist events). Multiple agencies within
DHHS discharge this mission:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
The CDC does not generally have regulatory authority to intervene in pub-
lic health matters, rather it works in partnership with state and local gov-
ernments to complement and bolster state-based capacity. CDC supports
public health emergency preparedness and response in five major ways:
■ Financial support for the public health activities of states and locali-
ties through grants and cooperative agreements.
■ Training programs and curriculum development to build the exper-
tise and skills of state and local public health officials.
■ Technical assistance and expert consultation to supplement state and
local capabilities when needed, including sophisticated laboratory
capacity to aid states in epidemiological investigations and the provi-
sion of emergency pharmaceuticals (for example, National Pharmaceu-
tical Stockpile), laboratory reagents, and other supplies and equipment
needed for emergency response.
■ Research activities to study the applied use of practices, countermea-
sures, and technology to respond to biological and chemical threats,
including broad-based demonstration projects that collectively repre-
sent significant financial support for capacity-building at state and local
levels.
■ Efforts to develop standards such as those related to laboratory
protocols and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
efforts to define standards for protective equipment used in laborato-
ries and emergency response.
An overview of key CDC programs to support public health emergency
preparedness is provided in Appendix B.
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While some of the CDC’s efforts are focused specifically on bioterrorism
threats, the agency supports public health emergency preparedness in a
much broader manner. The agency maintains that the best defense
against potential biological and chemical terrorist attacks is a robust
public health infrastructure prepared to respond to both naturally oc-
curring and man-made infectious disease threats. Just as investments to
counter bioterrorism have the “dual use”of improving preparedness for
naturally occurring threats (such as hantavirus, West Nile virus, and
influenza), capacity-building support not directly linked to bioterrorism
(such as training epidemiologists and federal support for tuberculosis
surveillance) strengthens the public health infrastructure and enhances
its ability to respond to bioterrorist incidents.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
The FDA’s responsibilities related to public health emergency prepared-
ness and response can be divided into two broad categories, those related
to safeguarding the food supply and those related to regulating the de-
velopment of new vaccines, antibiotics, other countermeasures, and di-
agnostic devices. As a regulatory agency, the FDA had direct authority
for establishing standards for food safety, inspecting manufacturing, pro-
cessing, and import facilities to ensure compliance with standards, and
taking corrective action to enforce those standards if they are not met.
These actions seek to safeguard the American public from disease threats,
both those occurring in nature and those initiated by man. As the regula-
tor of pharmaceuticals, biologic products, and medical devices, the FDA
also oversees the development of new therapies and technologies that
could be used to prepare for and respond to a public health emergency.
This includes the development of new vaccines and other countermea-
sures (for example, smallpox vaccine), as well as equipment to diagnose
the presence of pathogens or toxic substances in humans. As with its role
in safeguarding the food supply, the FDA has regulatory responsibility to
ensure that pharmaceutical and other products designed for human con-
sumption and use do not pose safety threats.
National Institutes of Health (NIH)
The NIH conducts and supports biomedical research. It funds basic re-
search geared toward gaining a better understanding of microorganisms
and other disease agents, as well as elucidating disease processes and
their impact on human health. The NIH also funds research targeted more
directly at the development of rapid diagnostics, more effective thera-
pies, and vaccines and other preventive measures.
Appendix A — Roles of Key Federal Agencies
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Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)
The OEP, housed within the Office of the Secretary in DHHS, is respon-
sible for coordinating medical response to public health emergencies,
including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and natural disease epidem-
ics. Working closely with other DHHS agencies and with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Department of Veterans Affairs, De-
partment of Defense, state and local governments, and private health care
providers (for example, hospitals and physician groups) through the Na-
tional Disaster Medical System, OEP ensures that resources are available
to provide medical services following a disaster or public health crisis
resulting in casualties that could overwhelm local capabilities. Activities
include assisting with the emergency medical response planning in states
and communities, the maintenance of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
that can deploy to disaster sites, and the Metropolitan Medical Response
System, a contractual arrangement with 97 localities to develop and co-
ordinate emergency medical response capabilities.
Agency for Health Care Quality and Research (AHRQ)
AHRQ is a research agency whose goal is to improve the quality, effec-
tiveness, efficiency, and accessibility of health care services. AHRQ’s ac-
tivities related to public health emergencies have focused on sponsoring
research that seeks to improve the clinical preparedness of health care
providers. For example, the agency has studied how best to communi-
cate with physicians and other private health care providers in the event
of a public health emergency and has assessed the most effective meth-
ods for training physicians about bioterrorist threats.
Office of Public Health Preparedness (OPHP)
The OPHP is a newly created office within the Immediate Office of the
Secretary charged with overseeing and coordinating preparedness activi-
ties within DHHS. The director of the OPHP reports directly to the secre-
tary and serves as the department’s liaison with the Office of Homeland
Security. Although the precise role of the office is still evolving, many
expect the OPHP to play an instrumental role in defining the department’s
priorities and monitoring agency performance relative to those objectives.
Public Health Service Commissioned Corps
One of the seven uniformed services of the United States, the Commis-
sioned Corps is a specialized career system to attract and retain health
professionals for government service. The corps is lead by the surgeon
general and consists of approximately 6,000 officers in a variety of health
Appendix A — Roles of Key Federal Agencies
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professions, including physicians, dentists, pharmacists, dietitians, nurses,
and veterinarians. Commissioned Corps officers are employed in a num-
ber of federal agencies, including the CDC, FDA, NIH, the Health Re-
sources and Services Administration, the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, and the Indian Health Service.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA)
The USDA’s responsibilities related to public health emergencies fall into
two general categories, those related to ensuring the safety of the food sup-
ply and those related to responding to disease in animals and plants. The
USDA shares its food safety responsibilities with the FDA. While the USDA
has regulatory oversight for the safety of meat, poultry, and processed egg
products, the FDA is charged with ensuring the safety of most other foods.
The USDA is also responsible for monitoring and promoting the health of
animals and plants. Because some diseases can infect both humans and
animals, the USDA would have a very important role to play in any public
health emergency that involved exposure to diseased animals.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
(FEMA)
FEMA is the lead federal agency for responding to and managing the
consequences of any disaster that prompts federal assistance. FEMA works
closely with a wide range of federal agencies, using the protocols and
relationships established in the Federal Response Plan. In addition to co-
ordinating federal disaster assistance, FEMA also provides grants and
training to states and localities to support first responder and emergency
medical capabilities and planning activities.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA)
The EPA is responsible for preparing for and responding to emergencies
involving oil, hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants. The EPA
has regulatory authority for establishing standards and thresholds for
the presence of these substances in the environment and has expertise in
environmental monitoring, sampling, decomtamination efforts, and longer
term site clean-up. The EPA also provides grant funding to states to pro-
mote clean air and water and to support compliance and enforcement of
other environmental standards.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (VA)
The VA operates one of the nation’s largest health care systems and is the
nation’s largest purchaser of pharmaceutical products. The VA purchases
Appendix A — Roles of Key Federal Agencies
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drugs and other therapeutics for the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
program and the National Medical Response Team stockpiles. At the lo-
cal level, VA facilities participate in community emergency medical pre-
paredness planning and would play a crucial role in ensuring adequate
surge capacity in the event of a public health emergency. With 163 hospi-
tals, over 800 medical clinics, and 135 nursing homes, the VA has a pres-
ence in every state and many communities.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)
DOD’s role in preparing for and responding to public health emergencies
can be summarized in three major activities: (a) research, (b) intelligence
gathering, and (c) civil support functions. Because many of the disease agents
identified as critical threats from a public health perspective have been
harnessed as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the U.S. military has
invested significant resources in developing better detection, prophylaxis,
and treatment for these disease agents. DOD conducts extensive research
on infectious and chemical disease agents. The U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases, or USAMRIID, serves as a confirmatory
diagnostic laboratory and subject matter expert for the CDC. Working with
others in the intelligence community, DOD also plays a key role in assess-
ing the threat of bioterrorism sponsored by foreign interests and helps to
evaluate the relative risk of different public health emergency scenarios.
DOD also sponsors training programs designed to enhance the capabilities
of federal, state, and local emergency responders in addressing WMDs and
high-yield explosives. Portions of this program, known as the Domestic
Preparedness Program, related to facilitating local emergency prepared-
ness were transferred to the Department of Justice in October 2000.2    In the
event of a profound public health emergency, DOD could also play a role
in subduing civil unrest and ensuring social order. Although the U.S. mili-
tary is precluded from enforcing U.S. law, under presidential executive or-
der, the military can be mobilized to assist civil authorities in maintaining
order. The Joint Task Force for Civil Support plans and coordinates DOD’s
support to FEMA in responding to federally declared disasters.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ)
DOJ sponsors research, training, and grants to improve the capabilities of
emergency responders, including police, fire and rescue personnel, and
emergency management personnel. For example, in 2001, DOJ sponsored
tabletop exercises in 52 cities to simulate the detection and management
of a bioterrorism incident. DOJ’s involvement in public health emergency
preparedness and response is not necessarily limited to bioterrorism
threats. The emergency capabilities supported by DOJ activities have “dual
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use” for naturally occurring emergencies. However, DOJ has a unique
role to play in emergencies that are of man-made origin. The Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for crisis management asso-
ciated with terrorist events. These activities include assessing the cred-
ibility of WMD threats and the criminal investigation of WMD incidents.
The FBI also houses the National Domestic Preparedness Office, which
coordinates all federal efforts to assist state and local emergency respond-
ers with planning, training, equipment, and supply needs.
OTHERS
A variety of other federal agencies, including the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT), the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Com-
merce, and the Department of Energy (DOE) have roles to play in prepar-
ing for and responding to public health emergencies. DOT has regulatory
authority over airports and shipping, important control points to guard
against the introduction and transmission of disease agents. The Secret
Service, which is housed within Treasury and includes experts focused
on chemical, biological, and radiological threats, is responsible for pro-
tecting the safety of the president, the vice president, and their families
and of visiting heads of state. Commerce establishes standards, test pro-
cedures, and user guides for the equipment used by criminal justice and
public safety personnel. DOE sponsors research related to enhancing
WMD response capabilities.
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Appendix B
Selected DHHS Programs and Initiatives Focused on
Public Health Preparedness
CENTERS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS (CPHP)
The CDC initiated a national system of Centers for Public Health Pre-
paredness to ensure that frontline public health workers have the skills
and competencies required to respond effectively to current and emerg-
ing health threats. The CPHP includes academic centers, specialty cen-
ters, and local exemplar centers.
■ Academic centers link schools of public health, state and local health
agencies, and other academic and community health partners to foster
individual preparedness at the front line. Seven recently funded
centers include the University of Illinois at Chicago School of Public
Health, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill School of Public
Health, University of Washington School of Public Health and Com-
munity Medicine, Columbia University Mailman School of Public
Health, University of Iowa College of Public Health, University of
South Florida College of Public Health, and St. Louis University School
of Public Health. These academic centers develop and deliver curricula
to public health practitioners, with many utilizing distance learning
capabilities to reach a broad audience.
■ Specialty centers of the CPHP focus on a specific topic, professional
discipline, core public health competency, practice setting, or applica-
tion of learning technology. The four funded centers are Dartmouth
College Medical School Interactive Media Laboratory (focused on
Internet applications for public health training), St. Louis University
School of Public Health (focused on comprehensive training), Johns
Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health and George-
town University Law Center (focused on public health law), and
University of Findlay National Center of Excellence for Environmental
Management (focused on emergency response training).
■ Local exemplar centers develop advanced applications at the commu-
nity level in three areas of key importance to preparedness for
bioterrorism and other urgent health threats:  integrated communications
and information systems across multiple sectors, advanced operational
readiness assessment, and comprehensive training and evaluation. These
Centers are the DeKalb County (Georgia) Health Department; Denver
Health, Denver Public Health; and the Monroe County (New York)
Health Department. (For additional information, see http://
www.phppo.cdc.gov/owpp/CPHPLocations.asp and http://
www.slu.edu/colleges/sph/bioterrorism/internet/centers.htm/.)
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EMERGING INFECTIONS PROGRAM (EIP)
The EIP is a network of CDC and state health departments (currently in
nine funded states). The network works with academic centers, local health
departments, hospital infection control practitioners, and other collabo-
rators to assess the public health impact of emerging infections and evalu-
ate methods for their prevention and control. EIP funds allow states to
conduct specialized, active disease surveillance programs that would not
otherwise be part of their disease surveillance systems. Because the EIP’s
aim is to be a national resource for surveillance, prevention, and control
of emerging infections, it transfers its findings broadly to public health
agencies in all 50 states. Two major projects are conducted at all EIP sites:
■ Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs)—population-based, active
laboratory surveillance for invasive diseases caused by emerging,
vaccine-preventable, or drug resistant organisms.
■ Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet)—a
population-based, active laboratory surveillance designed to monitor
incidences of foodborne and waterborne diseases.
Two additional projects are conducted at selected EIP sites: (a) Unexplained
Deaths and Critical Illnesses Project (in California, Connecticut, Minne-
sota, and Oregon)—population-based, active surveillance evaluating the
frequency of unexplained deaths and critical illnesses in previously healthy
persons aged 1 to 49 years  and (b) Electronic Laboratory-Based Report-
ing (ELR) for public health. (For additional information, see http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/osr/EIP.htm.)
EPIDEMIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (EIS)
The EIS is a two-year postgraduate program of service and on-the-job
training for health professionals interested in epidemiology. Headquar-
tered at the CDC, the EIS selects 60 to 80 persons per year from among
the health professional applicants to continue on-the-job training in ap-
plied epidemiologic skills. Physicians with at least one year of clinical
training, doctorate-level epidemiologists, dentists, veterinarians, physi-
cian assistants, and nurses with a master’s of public health degree are
eligible to apply. EIS officers serve as part of national and international
epidemiologic programs by conducting investigations, research, and pub-
lic health surveillance. They help address needs of state health depart-
ments, publish their work in the scientific literature, and disseminate vi-
tal public health information to the media and the public. (For additional
information, see http://www.cdc.gov/eis/index.htm.)
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EPIDEMIOLOGY AND LABORATORY CAPACITY
(ELC) FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENT
The ELC is intended to strengthen the nation’s capacity to recognize and
respond to emerging infectious disease threats by assisting state and eli-
gible local public health agencies in improving their basic epidemiologic
and laboratory capacity. The program provides funds to all 50 states,
Puerto Rico, and six large cities with an emphasis on notifiable disease,
food-, water-, and vector-borne diseases; vaccine-preventable diseases;
and drug-resistant infections. The programs are intended to identify and
monitor disease occurrences, characterize disease determinants, identify
and respond to infectious disease emergencies, use public health data to
set priorities, and to assess the effectiveness of these activities. Crucial to
this program is the strengthening of collaborations between laboratory
and epidemiology practice. (For additional information, see http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/osr/ELC.htm.)
EPI-INFO
Epi-Info is public domain software designed for the global community of
public health practitioners and researchers. It provides form and data-
base construction, data entry, and analysis with epidemiologic statistics,
maps, and graphs. A 1997 survey found 145,000 copies of the various
versions of the software in use in 117 countries. Epi-Info is developed and
distributed by the Division of Public Health Surveillance and Informatics,
whose purpose is to provide and to improve access to and use of public
health information. (For additional information, see http://www.cdc.gov/
epiinfo/aboutepi.htm.)
EPIDEMIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE (EPI-X)
Epi-X is a secure, web-based communications network for the rapid ex-
change of public health information. The system enables federal, state,
and local epidemiologists, laboratorians, and other members of the pub-
lic health community to notify colleagues of urgent public health events,
receive daily e-mail messages about newly posted information, create
reports and track information, review information on outbreaks through
a searchable database, rapidly communicate with colleagues, find con-
tact information for public health officials, and request assistance from
the CDC on-line. The CDC is currently working to expand the user base
of Epi-X and to improve the system’s capabilities. (For additional infor-
mation, see http://www.cdc.gov/programs/research5.htm.)
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HEALTH ALERT NETWORK (HAN)
HAN provides funding and technical assistance to local and state health
departments to ensure adequate information systems and communica-
tions capacity, such as full Internet connectivity. HAN is a nationwide
information and communication system designed as a platform for dis-
tribution of health alerts, dissemination of prevention guidelines, dis-
tance learning, national disease surveillance, electronic laboratory report-
ing and the CDC’s bioterrorism preparedness training. HAN will ensure
high-speed, secure, Internet access; capacity for rapid and secure com-
munications with first responder agencies; and capacity to securely trans-
mit surveillance, laboratory, and other sensitive data. Included in this
plan are early warning broadcast alert systems. HAN funds are used to
purchase and install electronic computing and communications equip-
ment; develop and deliver training in the use of information technology;
develop electronic tools to support preparedness; disseminate authori-
tative preparedness, diagnosis, and treatment guidelines; and develop
science-based performance standards. HAN funds have been provided
to all 50 state health agencies, the District of Columbia, the territory of
Guam, three metropolitan health departments (Chicago, Los Angeles,
and New York), the three local exemplar Centers for Public Health Pre-
paredness, and the specialty academic Center for Public Health Prepared-
ness at St. Louis University School of Public Health. (For additional in-
formation, see http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/han/FactSheet.asp.)
LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK  (LRN)
The LRN is a joint program of the CDC and the Association of Public
Health Laboratories. It was developed by the CDC, the Association of
Public Health Laboratories (APHL), and the FBI for the express purpose
of dealing with bioterrorism and other terrorism threats. The LRN is com-
posed of county, city, state, and federal public health laboratories to en-
sure adequate capacity for preparing for and responding to acts of terror-
ism. This network can accept specimens and samples from hospitals, clin-
ics, the FBI and other law enforcement groups, emergency medical ser-
vices, the military, and other agencies. The LRN comprises four levels of
laboratories: Level A, clinical labs; Level B, public health labs; Level C,
public health labs with typing capabilities; and Level D, specialized CDC
labs with advanced capabilities. The laboratories participating in the LRN
use consistent testing protocols and refer to higher-level labs for more
advanced testing.  (For additional information, see http://
www.phppo.cdc.gov/nltn/pdf/LRN99.pdf.)
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METROPOLITAN MEDICAL RESPONSE SYSTEM
(MMRS)
The MMRS seeks to integrate existing emergency response systems at the
local level, including emergency management, medical and mental health
providers, public health departments, law enforcement, fire departments,
emergency medical services, and the National Guard. Through contrac-
tual relationships with municipalities, MMRS provides funding and tech-
nical assistance to aid metropolitan areas in developing a unified, regional
response to mass casuality events. As of September 30, 2001, the OEP has
contracted with 97 municipalities to develop MMRSs, and additional com-
munities are expected to be added in FY 2002. (For additional informa-
tion, see  http://ndms.dhhs.gov/CT_Program/MMRS/mmrs.html.)
NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM (NDMS)
The NDMS is a cooperative asset-sharing program among federal gov-
ernment agencies, state and local governments, private businesses, and
civilian volunteers to ensure that medical resources are available follow-
ing a disaster that overwhelms local resources. A Management Support
Team provides field command and control in a disaster for deployed fed-
eral medical assets, coordinating communications, transportation, a medi-
cal cache and other logistical support. In each NDMS area, Disaster Medi-
cal Assistance Teams and Specialty Teams are organized by a sponsor,
usually a medical center, health department, or disaster organization. The
Federal Response Plan includes provisions for NDMS to provide victim
identification and mortuary services through its partnership with the
National Association for Search and Rescue with activation of the Disas-
ter Mortuary Operational Response Teams. In addition, NDMS provides
assistance in assessing the extent of disruption and need for veterinary
services following major emergencies through their agreement with the
American Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams. All of these teams com-
prise properly certified and licensed private citizens who are activated in
case of a disaster. When activation occurs, all states recognize licensure
and certification and team members are compensated for their duty time
by the federal government as temporary federal employees. (For addi-
tional information, see http://ndms.dhhs.gov/NDMS/ndms.html.)
NATIONAL LABORATORY SYSTEM
The NLS is an initiative to strengthen relationships between the medical
care community and public health. In partnership with the APHL, CDC
founded demonstration projects in four states (Minnesota, Nebraska,
Washington, and Michigan) to serve as models for fostering improved
relationships between clinical and public health laboratories. Activities
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undertaken by grantees include assessing clinical lab capabilities to de-
termine if these facilities could supplement public health laboratories in
the event of a public health emergency, developing specimen transport sys-
tems, improving communication capabilities, developing training mate-
rials and testing protocols tailored to clinical laboratorians, and improv-
ing adherence to existing testing guidelines related to antimicrobial resis-
tance and other testing protocols. (For additional information, see http:/
/www.phppo.cdc.gov/mlp/nls_contacts.asp.)
NATIONAL LABORATORY TRAINING NETWORK
(NLTN)
The NLTN provides clinical, environmental, and public health labora-
tory training courses to laboratorians working in state and local public
health labs. The NLTN uses six regional offices to identify training needs,
deliver courses, and evaluate NLTN training programs.  Continuing edu-
cation units are available to participants who successfully complete train-
ing. The NLTN is sponsored by the Association of Public Health Labora-
tories and the CDC. (For additional information, see http://
www.phppo.cdc.gov/nltn/default.asp.)
NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL STOCKPILE (NPS)
The NPS ensures the availability of life-saving pharmaceuticals, antibi-
otics, chemical interventions, and medical and surgical support supplies
and equipment in the event of a disaster that overwhelms local resources.
Utilizing two response components, NPS is designed to supplement and
resupply state and local public health agencies with their repository of
antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, in-
travenous administration, airway maintenance supplies, and medical/
surgical items. The contents of the stockpile is determined by expert pan-
els convened by the CDC. If a request is made by a state or territory for
deployment, the director of the CDC, in consultation with the surgeon
general and the secretary of HHS, may release a 12-hour “push package”
for quick delivery into the field. Eight of these packages are fully stocked
and positioned in environmentally controlled and secured warehouses
ready for immediate deployment.  Follow-up packages, known as Ven-
dor Managed Inventory (VMI), containing materials customized in re-
sponse to the emergency type, may follow within 24 to 36 hours if needed.
The CDC transfers authority for the NPS material to the state or local
authorities once it arrives at the local airfield where it may be repack-
aged and labeled with the CDC’s technical assistance. (For additional
information, see http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/nps/default.htm.)
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NATIONAL ELECTRONIC DISEASE SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEM (NEDSS)
NEDSS is an initiative that promotes the development and adoption of
data and information system standards to advance the development of
efficient, integrated, and interoperable disease surveillance systems at the
federal, state, and local levels. NEDSS provides funding, technical assis-
tance, and model systems to states to assist them in moving their disease
surveillance systems to NEDSS standards, which are based on industry
standards for clinical information systems.   (For additional information,
see http://www.cdc.gov/nedss/index.htm.)
NATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS PROGRAM (NPHPSP)
The NPHPSP is a partnership effort to develop performance standards
for public health practice as defined by the essential services of public
health, collect and analyze performance data, and improve system-wide
performance. The CDC is developing comprehensive performance mea-
surement tools for both the state and local levels in conjunction with As-
sociation of State and Territorial Health Officials, the National Associa-
tion of County and City Health Officials, and other national public health
organizations. These tools are designed as self-assessment instruments to
aid public health officials in assessing the capacity of their own systems.
(For additional information, see http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/nphpsp/.)
PUBLIC HEALTH TRAINING NETWORK (PHTN)
The PHTN is a distance learning system utilizing a variety of instruc-
tional media to meet the training needs of the national public health
workforce. PHTN programs have delivered nearly one million training
opportunities to professionals and have proven to be effective ways to
update and enhance professional competencies. The PHTN’s long-term
vision is to promote a global network providing training and learning
needs for public health professionals worldwide. The PHTN serves as
platform upon which a wide variety of educational programming and
training is delivered, including training related to emergency prepared-
ness, as well as training for clinical preventive services and other public
health interventions. (For additional information, see http://
www.phppo.cdc.gov/PHTN//default.asp.)
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Appendix C — Local Public Health Agency (LPHA) Service Offerings
Population-Based Services
Infectious Disease Control
Epidemiology and Surveillance
Communicable Disease Control
Laboratory
Environmental Health
Air Quality
Food Safety
Sewage
Vectors
Surface Water
Drinking Water
Animal Control
Occupational Health
Inspections
Food and Milk
Public Drinking Water
Recreational Water
Restaurants
Health-Related Facilities
Population-Based Health Promotion
Community Assessment
Outreach and Education
Injury Control
Tobacco Prevention
Violence Prevention
Service Provided by LPHAs
(directly or through
contract)
84
94
45
44
85
74
61
43
72
40
19
62
44
49
80
38
80
90
37
68
22
Service Provided by
Another Agency or
Private Sector
11
3
48
33
12
23
29
49
23
51
65
34
53
42
19
56
10
6
40
22
58
Service Not Provided
6
3
8
22
2
3
10
8
5
9
15
3
4
9
1
7
10
5
22
10
19
TABLE C-1
Availability of Population-Based Services from LPHAs and Other Providers
(by percentage of LPHA jurisdictions in which service is offered)
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Appendix C — Local Public Health Agency Service Offerings
TABLE C-2
Availability of Personal Health Services from LPHAs and Other Providers
(by percentage of LPHA jurisdictions in which service is offered)
*Immunization offerings vary. Percentages shown include jurisdictions in which any adult immunization is offered. LPHAs are most likely to offer
influenza vaccine (91 percent) and least likely to offer pneumoccal vaccine (75 percent).
✝Screening offerings vary. Percentages shown include jurisdictions in which any screening service is offered. LPHAs are most likely to offer blood pressure
screening (81percent) and least likely to offer cardiovascular screening (50 percent).
Personal Health Services
Emergency Response
Adult Immunizations*
Childhood Immunizations
HIV Testing and Counseling
HIV Treatment
STD Testing and Counseling
TB Testing
TB Treatment
EPSDT
WIC
Family Planning
Prenatal Care
Chronic Disease Screenings✝
School Health
Primary Care
Dental
Case Management
Health Education
Home Health
Health Care for Homeless
LPHAs Provide Service
(directly or through contract)
61
91
89
64
25
65
88
71
59
67
58
41
81
46
18
30
67
87
36
11
Another Agency or
Private Sector
Provides Service
35
7
8
27
65
26
8
24
33
37
33
46
16
45
72
53
26
8
58
47
Service Not Provided
4
3
3
8
11
8
4
5
8
8
8
12
3
9
11
17
7
5
6
43
